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Yeltsin

From The Long Union, an encyclopedia of a world that didn't happen

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin (1931–2007) was President of the Russian Sovereign Republic from 1991 until his resignation in 1999, the most powerful figure in the early years of the Union of Soviet Sovereign States and the political force that transformed Soviet collapse into a surviving confederation.

Yeltsin rose to prominence during Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary, serving as First Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party from 1985 to 1987 before his dismissal over accusations of excessive radicalism. Elected to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, he became the public face of reform sentiment within the old Soviet system. He was elected President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in June 1991, a position from which he wielded authority over the largest and most economically significant of the Soviet republics.

During the August Emergency in August 1991, Yeltsin resisted the coup attempt from his position at the Russian parliament building, the White House, establishing himself as the champion of democratic resistance. After the coup's collapse, he held the political initiative to negotiate the shape of whatever confederation would replace the Soviet Union. His strategy was to preserve the Russian Sovereign Republic's dominance while appearing to accept a looser federation. As President of Russia within the new structure, Yeltsin became chief negotiator in the talks that produced the Novo-Ogaryovo Accords in March 1992, the treaty that created the Union of Soviet Sovereign States from nine republics and allowed Georgia, the Baltic states, and the other departed republics to exit.

Through the 1990s, Yeltsin engaged in a series of confrontations with the Union's nominal leaders over economic policy. The most significant came in 1993–1994, when he clashed with Union premier Gorbachev and the central planning apparatus over the pace and reach of price liberalization. The Russian republic's economy was contracting while the Union center insisted on continued subsidies to unprofitable industries. The Compromise of Sochi, reached in 1994, established a dual-track pricing system that allowed Moscow to release some prices to the market while maintaining central price controls on essentials, temporarily resolving the deadlock but leaving both sides dissatisfied.

Yeltsin's fiscal control over the Russian republic made him the effective power in the Union, but his authority was undermined by the same centrifugal forces that were weakening Moscow's grip across all the republics. Regional governors accumulated power during the 1990s, and by 1998 the Union faced a currency crisis and default on its rouble bonds. The Union Rouble crisis of 1998 was the severest test of the confederation's stability since its founding. The central government's credibility collapsed as the rouble was devalued and emergency reforms were imposed. Yeltsin's government bore responsibility for the management of the crisis and suffered severe political damage from it, though the Union did not dissolve.

By the late 1990s, Yeltsin's health was visibly declining. Reports from the Archives of the Russian Presidential Library indicate he suffered multiple small strokes and cardiac episodes in 1998 and 1999. His authority within the Russian republic itself was fragmenting as regional leaders extracted greater autonomy and Moscow's ability to enforce fiscal discipline evaporated. In December 1999, with his presidency due to expire in elections he was unlikely to win, Yeltsin announced his resignation on New Year's Eve and transferred power to Vladimir Putin, the head of the FSB.

Yeltsin's legacy was shaped by an irreconcilable contradiction. He had preserved the Soviet state in institutional form—the Union of Soviet Sovereign States still bore the marks of his negotiating hand—but he lacked either the authority or the will to govern it coherently once it existed. The Union that emerged from the Novo-Ogaryovo Accords could not generate sufficient fiscal revenue to maintain a functional center, and Yeltsin's Russia, despite its nominal dominance, could not impose discipline on the republics. The Confederal Drift that hollowed out central authority during the 1990s began under Yeltsin's watch and was accelerated by his strategic indifference to the mechanics of Union governance, his focus instead on preserving Russian autonomy. By 1998, when the Union's currency collapsed, the architecture he had negotiated was already failing, and the pathway toward the decentralized, energy-dependent system that would emerge after the Tyumen Compact of 2014 was visible.

His relationship with the outside world was complicated by his dependence on Western credits in the early 1990s and his later, reluctant accommodation with the Blagoveshchensk Framework of 2005, which had already been negotiated by his successors. The shift toward China as the Union's primary external financial anchor occurred after his presidency, but the conditions for it—the collapse of the Union's fiscal capacity and the diminishment of Moscow's authority—were established during his tenure. Yeltsin died in Moscow in 2007.

References

  1. 1.The August Emergency and the Road to Novo-Ogaryovo]]: A historical account of Yeltsin's role in resisting the coup and negotiating the Novo-Ogaryovo Accords, Moscow State University Press, 2001, pp. 203–247
  2. 2.Archives of the Russian Presidential Library]]: Presidential papers and administrative records, 1991–1999, Russian Presidential Library, Moscow
  3. 3.Oral History Project: Voices from 1992]]: Archived interviews with principal negotiators of the Novo-Ogaryovo Accords, including testimony from officials in Yeltsin's administration, Institute for Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, 2003
  4. 4.The Confederal Drift: Energy]], economics, and the fragmentation of Union authority, 1992–2014, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 85–134
  5. 5.Shlapentokh, Vladimir, The State and Society in the Late Soviet Union: Transition to the New Russia, Westview Press, 1992
Categories: Presidents of the Russian Sovereign Republic | Architects of the Novo-Ogaryovo Accords | Soviet and post-Soviet politics | 1991–2000
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